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Abstract
This paper evaluates the role of financial intermediaries, such as banks, on the
extensive margin of activity. We build a DSGE model that combines the endogenous
determination of the number of firms operating on the goods market with financial
frictions through a financial accelerator mechanism. We more particularly account for
the fact that the creation of a new activity partly requires loans to finance spendings
during the setting period. This model is estimated on US data between 1993Q1
to 2012Q3. We get three main results. First, financial frictions play a key role in
determining the number of new firms. Second, in contrast with real macroeconomic
shocks (where investment in existing production lines and the creation of new firms
move in the opposite direction), financial shocks have a cumulative effect on the two
margins of activity, amplifying macroeconomic fluctuations. Third, the critical role of
financial factors is mainly observed in the period corresponding to the creation of new
firms. In the long run, the variance of the effective entry share is almost explained
by supply shocks.
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1 Introduction
The creation of new firms is a key aspect of business cycles. This feature is now widely
documented in the empirical literature and has given rise to a series of theoretical papers
following the path-breaking contribution of Bilbiie et al. (2007). However, although finan-
cial decisions are a critical aspect of the creation of new activities, most of the existing
literature on the extensive margin of activity assumes a marginal contribution of financial
factors by neglecting the key role of banks.
The aim of this paper is to evaluate the effect of financial frictions on the extensive
margin of activity. We more particularly investigate how the financial accelerator may
have an impact on the creation of new firms. We build a Dynamic Stochastic General
Equilibrium (DSGE) model that combines the endogenous determination of the number of
firms with financial frictions giving rise to the financial accelerator. This model is estimated
using recent developments of Bayesian econometrics on US data over a sample time period
running from 1993Q1 to 2012Q3.
In this setting, the decision to create a new production unit emanates from both house-
holds and entrepreneurs. As new firms have to be built one period before the production
of the new goods, entrepreneurs must borrow from financial intermediaries to finance part
of the initial wage bill required to pay workers during the entry period. Thus, with respect
to traditional DSGE models with financial frictions, we enlarge the financial constraint of
entrepreneurs to account for the choice of investing limited resources either in the capital
of existing firms or financing new production lines. As a consequence, both capital accumu-
lation (that determines the intensive margin of activity) and firm entry (that determines
the extensive margin of activity) are affected by financial frictions and financial shocks. We
more particularly consider shocks to the net worth of entrepreneurs (that can be associ-
ated to fluctuations on the stock exchange) and to the mark up of banking activity (which
deteriorates the lending conditions in the economy). In line with the solution introduced
by Bilbiie et al. (2007), we assimilate the number of firms to the number of goods available
for consumption.1
In this paper, we get three main results. First, we find that financial frictions play a
critical role in replicating real world data. In particular a wage bill in advance constraint
links the creation of firms to the lending conditions of the banking system. This friction is
helpful to fix the problem observed in the original setting of Bilbiie et al. (2007) regarding
the counterintuitive increase in the number of new firms following an increase in the interest
rate. We find that bank lending conditions play a key role as a transmission channel for
monetary policy shocks to get a standard drop in the number of firm creation following a
restrictive monetary policy decision. In our financial environment the creation of new firms
by entrepreneurs depends on an interest rate set by the banking system and no longer on
the sole policy rate set by the monetary authorities.
Second, the need to finance investment in existing firms and the creation of new goods’
varieties with bank loans affect the dynamics of the economy. The consequences of financial
1For a critical assessment of this assumption, we refer the reader to the introduction of Bilbiie et al.
(2007). According to their solution, we will use the terms “firm” and “good” interchangeably, as each firm
in the model is specialised in the production of one type of good.
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shocks are particularly destabilizing: In contrast with real macroeconomic shocks,2 financial
shocks have a cumulative effect on the two margins of activity. In particular, when looking
at the time path of the effective share of entry on a quarter-on-quarter basis, we find that
the contribution of financial shocks is slightly positive up to 2008, while it has a clear
depressing impact on firm entry since 2009.
Third, the forecast error variance decomposition of the effective share of entry underlines
the critical role played by financial factors in the period corresponding to the creation of new
firms. In the very short run, new firms’ creation is almost entirely explained by financial
shocks (that explain around 50% of the variance) and demand shocks. However in the
longer run, the fluctuation of entries is mainly explained by supply shocks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the contribution of
the paper to the literature on the extensive margin. Section 3 describes the role of the
financial sector for the creation of new firms. Section 4 presents the rest of the model.
Section 5 is devoted to the estimation of the model using Bayesian econometrics. Section 6
evaluates the consequences of financial frictions on the transmission of real and monetary
shocks to the macroeconomic equilibrium. Section 7 studies the contribution of financial
factors in the evolution of the extensive margin of activity. Section 8 evaluates the key role
of the financial dividend policy and of the wage bill in advance requirement in shaping the
dynamics of entry in the economy. Section 9 concludes.
2 Contribution to the literature
This paper studies the role of financial frictions on the intensive margin (changes in the pro-
duction of existing goods) and extensive margin (changes in the number of varieties/firms)
of US activity. Our analysis combines two growing branches of the macroeconomics liter-
ature in a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) setting: models with endoge-
nous firm entry and models accounting for the financial accelerator.
To our knowledge, the macroeconomic analysis of endogenous firms entry can be traced
back to Peretto (1999), Ghironi and Melitz (2007) and Colciago and Etro (2010). By
underlying the fact that activity moves at both the intensive and extensive margins, this
literature has provided new insights on the way shocks are transmitted to the macroe-
conomic equilibrium. The path-breaking contribution of Bilbiie et al. (2007) has been
particularly influential in providing a new standard for studying the transmission of real
and monetary shocks in a tractable dynamic setting. These authors show how economic
expansions induce higher entry rates and how the sluggish response in the number of pro-
ducers (due to sunk entry costs and a time-to-build lag) generates a new and potentially
important endogenous propagation mechanism for real business cycle models and monetary
policy decisions in a sticky price environment. The key equation of their framework consists
in a no-arbitrage condition that equalizes the market value of the prospective entrant to
a sunk cost representing the cost of building a new activity. Their model also accounts
2Where investment in existing production lines and in new firms move in the opposite way, following
the arbitrage of entrepreneurs regarding the allocation of financial resources between these two competing
outcomes.
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for a time to build delay, as a new firm can only provide a new good to the consumer
one period after its entry on the market. The entry period is devoted to the building of
the new production line which incurs labour costs to the firm. This setting is particularly
flexible for the analysis of a wide range of macroeconomic questions in both closed and
open economies (see Etro (2014) for an up to date survey).
In the original model of Bilbiie et al. (2007), the opportunity of introducing new varieties
for consumption is mainly affected by real factors. The financial environment plays a
limited role in the building of new production lines, as investment in new productive units
is financed by households through the accumulation of shares in the portfolio of firms.
The stock-market price of this investment fluctuates endogenously in response to shocks
independently of financial markets. This solution, that simplifies the financial side of
the model, may be at odds with many real life situations, where entrepreneurs face a
binding financial constraint to finance new projects. Following Etro (2014), credit market
imperfections could be introduced to take into account the access to credit for business
creation. As underlined by Casares and Poutineau (2013), surveys of current and potential
entrepreneurs suggest that raising funds from the market and/or bank loans is one of the
biggest hurdles to invest in a new business. Furthermore, as shown in different studies
(Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990); Jayaratne and Strahan (1996); Levine (1997); Beck
et al. (2000); Guiso et al. (2004)) cross-sectional differences in the ability of capital markets
to select and finance the most promising entrepreneurs may lead to important differences
in entrepreneurship and productivity growth across economies.
Financial intermediaries, such as banks, play a key role in the birth of new firms by
relaxing the financial constraint of entrepreneurs over their net wealth. This role has
already been underlined by a series of recent papers. La Croce and Rossi (2015) build a
DSGE model with monopolistic competitive banks and endogenous firms entry. Focusing
on the role of the banking sector in the interaction with firms’ dynamics, they get higher
volatilities of both real and financial variables than those implied by a fixed number of firms.
In a companion paper, La Croce and Rossi (2014) consider a model with endogenous entry,
flexible prices, monopolistic competitive banks and sticky interest rates, accounting for
macroprudential policy rules. In both models, incumbent firms face a wage bill in advance
constraint (a device that will be kept in our model) and financial frictions amplify the effect
of shocks. A third example of this branch of the literature is Bergin et al. (2014). In their
model, firms can finance entry costs through a combination of debt and equity, so that
financial shocks directly impact the financing of firm entry. In their setting, they find that
the entry of new firms limits the ability of incumbent firms to respond to negative financial
shocks through endogenous capital restructuring. As an original result, they find that as
the number of firms falls after an adverse financial shock. This provides an useful margin
of macroeconomic adjustment that reduces the overall impact of the shock on aggregate
output, as the remaining firms become financially stronger and better able to withstand a
financial shock. Recently Rossi (2015) has underlined the key role of the banking sector in
generating an additional shock transmission channel that tries to amplify the consequences
of recessionary shocks on the extensive margin of activity in a model with endogenous entry
and exit.3
3More particularly, she shows that the endogeneity of firms’ exit generates an additional shock trans-
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In line with this growing literature, our paper provides an analysis of the interplay
between the financial sector and the extensive margin of activity. However, we depart from
these papers on three major strands:
First, we take into account the key role of the entrepreneur as the provider of funds
for the creation of new varieties. This agent allocates its net wealth and loans obtained
from the banking system between the financing of capital to firms already operating on
the market and the financing of new firms creation, one period before the production of
new goods. As in Poutineau and Vermandel (2015), we assume that entrepreneurs are
optimistic, namely that they tend to overestimate the profitability of investment projects.
This approach, that accounts for a key factor in the creation of new varieties, gives rise to a
financial accelerator in line with Bernanke et al. (1999). As underlined by Etro (2014), this
introduces a new mechanism of propagation and amplification of shocks that has nothing
to do with capital accumulation, intertemporal substitution of labour and price rigidities.
Second, our model combines three types of rigidities related to prices, wages and lend-
ing rates. Regarding the later variable, we develop the role of the banking system that
determines the interest rate of loans subscribed by entrepreneurs. This part of the model
is in line with Bernanke et al. (1999), Gerali et al. (2010) and Christiano et al. (2014).
We assume that banks collect deposits from households and lend to entrepreneurs. As in
Gerali et al. (2010) and Darracq-Parie`s et al. (2011), we take into account the imperfect
pass-through of the policy rate to the bank lending rate. To get an homogenous representa-
tion of adjustment costs between agents, we suppose that banks are affected by an original
Rotemberg (1982) technology when adjusting their lending rate. This nominal rigidity,
that gives rise to an imperfect pass-through in the transmission of the policy rate to the
lending rate, is deemed necessary to get a better fit of the model.
Third, in our setting we quantify the relative contribution of financial shocks to the
fluctuations of the extensive margin of activity on US data between 1993Q1 and 2012Q3.
These shocks have appeared to be an important source of macroeconomic fluctuations in
recent times, as exemplified by the financial crisis of 2007–2009. Completing the original
setting of Bilbiie et al. (2007) with a description of the financial sector closer to real life
situations is helpful to understand how shocks related to the banking system (though
the channel of lending interest rates) or to the stock exchange (through the value of the
net wealth of entrepreneurs and the collateral required by the banking system to provide
loans) affect the relative contribution of the extensive and intensive margins to output
fluctuations of activity. In contrast to the existing literature presented above, we use
Bayesian econometrics as in Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007) to assess the quantitative
content of our analysis on US data. Our econometric approach is now standard to this class
model and has previously been implemented by Lewis and Stevens (2015) in a monetary
DSGE model with endogenous firm/product entry and a translog expenditure function.
We complete this last paper by introducing financial frictions.
mission channel through the banking sector. Indeed, the indirect consequence of firms’ endogenous default
is that, every time firms’ exit probability increases, banks optimally try to preserve their profits by increas-
ing their interest rate on loans. Thus banks’ mark-up becomes countercyclical, as it increases in face of
recessionary shocks, while it decreases in response to expansionary shocks.
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3 The Financial Sector
The general structure of the model is summarized in Figure 1. The economy is populated
by households, intermediate and final firms, entrepreneurs and a banking system. House-
holds consume final goods and supply labour to firms. The intermediate sector produces
intermediate goods that are combined by final firms to become final goods. Each firm is
specialized in the production of a specific (either intermediate or final) good. The total
number of final firms/goods is normalized to 1, while the total number of intermediate
firms/goods4 is endogenously determined in the model to define the extensive margin of
activity.
Financial
Intermediaries
Monetary
Policy
Entrepreneurs
Capital
Producers
Installed
Firms
Entering
Firms
Households
Labour
Unions
Loans
Lt+1
Capital Supply
QtKt+1
Refinancing
Rate Rt
Labour
Ht
Consump-
tion Ct
Startups
Financing
Capital
Financing
Desired
Wage Wht
Negotiated
Wage Wt
Investment
Goods It
Deposits Bt
Figure 1: A new keynesian model with endogenous entry under financial frictions
To get a simple approach to the way financial decisions shape the dynamics of the model,
we first single out the entrepreneur. This solution initially introduced by Bernanke et al.
(1999) is helpful to get the intuition of the acceleration phenomenon in a DSGE setting
with intensive and extensive margins. The rest of this section analyses the interactions
between financial intermediaries, entrepreneurs and firms, according to Figure 2 while the
rest of the model (summarized in Figure 1) will be presented in the next section.
Financial
Intermediaries
Entrepreneurs
New Firms
(extensive)
Existing Firms
(intensive)
Financing wage bill
γWtH
E
t
Financing capital
QtKt+1
Loans
Lt+1
Production Sector
Figure 2: Implementing financial frictions in a model with endogenous entry
4Taking a broader view, it could be said that the creation of one new good corresponds to either one
additional production line in an existing firm or the creation of a single new firm.
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3.1 Entrepreneurs and the External Finance Premium
Our economy is populated by entrepreneurs e ∈ [0, nt], where nt denotes the number of firms
in the economy. The representative entrepreneur is a key agent for introducing financial
frictions.5
This agent finances both the intensive margin (by renting capital to existing firms)
and the extensive margin (by financing the wage bill for the creation of new firms). En-
trepreneurs face a trade-off between intensive and extensive margins financing. On the one
hand, the finance of new business in t will automatically increase in t+ 1 both the stock of
physical capital and entrepreneurs’ profits.6 On the other hand, financing new business in
t rises entrepreneurs’ leverage which in turn increases the cost of capital for existing firms
and reduces the intensive margin. These two investment opportunities are financed by the
entrepreneur’s net wealth, denoted NWet+1, and by loans from the financial intermediary
system denoted Ldet+1. The balance sheet of the representative entrepreneur is given by:
Ldet+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
loans
+NWet+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
net wealth
= QtKet+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
intensive production
+ γWtH
E
et︸ ︷︷ ︸
extensive production
. (1)
where γ denotes the fraction of inputs costs involved in the production process of new
entrants, i.e. WtH
E
et with H
E
et the hours worked required for starting new business at a
wage Wt, while Ket+1 denotes the total amount of physical capital involved in the inten-
sive production by installed firms and Qt is the price of capital. These two investment
opportunities are both financed by entrepreneurs through loans and net wealth.
The investment projects undertaken by the entrepreneur are risky and differ with respect
to their individual returns. To model individual riskiness, we borrow from Bernanke et al.
(1999) and assume that each project has an individual return equal to ω
(
1 +Rkt
)
, i.e.
that the aggregate return of investment projects in the economy 1 + Rkt is multiplied
by a random value ω. In this setting, we assume that the random value ω follows a
Pareto distribution. Namely, ω ∼ P (κ, ωmin) where ω ∈ [ωmin; +∞[, κ > 1 is the shape
parameter and ωmin > 0 is the minimum bound of ω. The ex post profit of each project
is, ΠEet (ω) = ω
(
1 +Rkt
)
Qt−1Ket (ω) −
(
1 +RLt−1
)
Ldet (ω) where R
L
t−1 is the lending rate
decided by financial intermediaries. The critical value that distinguishes profitable from
non-profitable projects is ωCet such that Π
E
et
(
ωCet
)
= 0:
ωCet
(
1 +Rkt
)
Qt−1Ket
(
ωCet
)
=
(
1 +RLt−1
)
Ldet
(
ωCet
)
. (2)
In order to acquire a loan, entrepreneurs have to engage in a financial contract before
the realization of ωCet.
7 After engaging in the financial contract, entrepreneurs recognize
5The introduction of financial frictions is achieved through a financial accelerator a` la Bernanke et al.
(1999) reinterpreted in a banking perspective as in Poutineau and Vermandel (2015). We extend the model
of Poutineau and Vermandel (2015) to account for the extensive margin of activity.
6The law of motion of firms in the economy is discussed in a following section (see equation Equation 20)
and is standard with the canonical framework of Bilbiie et al. (2007).
7The endogenous threshold ωCet is also referred as an idiosyncratic shock in the financial accelerator
literature. The debt contract is conclude before the idiosyncratic shock is recognized which generates
unexpected losses for the entrepreneurs.
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ex post the value of ωCet which separates the default space (ω < ω
C
et) from the gainful
space (ω ≥ ωCet). Using the characteristics of the Pareto distribution F (ω), the distribution
of stochastic investment projects ω has a positive support, is independently distributed
(across entrepreneurs and time) with unitary mean E [ω] = 1, and density function f(ω).
Investment projects above the cut-off value, ω > ωCet, have positive profits Π
E
et (ω) ≥ 0 which
allows entrepreneurs to repay its loans to the bank. The share of profitable projects 1 −
F (ω) is computed as, η = Pr
[
ω ≥ ωC] = ∫∞
ωC
f (ω)dω = (ωmin/ω
C)κ while the conditional
expectation of ω when entrepreneur’s project is gainful is, ηω¯ =
∫∞
ωC
ωf (ω) dω with ω¯ =
E
[
ω|ω ≥ ωC] = κ
κ−1ω
C . Default occurs for projects below the cut-off value (ω < ωCet), in
this situation it is too costly for the entrepreneur to pay back the contracted loan and prefers
to default and obtain no gain from these projects. The expected profit of entrepreneur e
after aggregating all investment projects ω above the critical threshold (
∫∞
ωCt+1
ΠEet+1 (ω)dω)
requires that:
dEet+1 =
{
ω¯et+1
(
1 +Rkt+1
)
QtKet+1 −
(
1 +RLt
)
Ldet+1 with probability ηet+1,
0 with probability 1− ηet+1, (3)
where ηet+1 (ω¯et+1) is the expected time-varying share (value) of gainful projects. As a
main departure from both Bernanke et al. (1999) and the contract theory, we assume that
entrepreneurs cannot screen the value of ω¯et+1 ex ante. Thus, ω
C
et cannot be a control
variable of the financial contract between borrowers and lenders. To introduce a finan-
cial accelerator mechanism, we follow Poutineau and Vermandel (2015) by assuming that
entrepreneurs’ forecasts regarding the aggregate profitability of a given project ω¯et are op-
timistic (i.e., biased upwards). As entrepreneurs hold distorted beliefs about their own
ability and asset returns, the perceived ex ante value of profitable projects is defined by
the isoleastic function:
g (ω¯et+1) = ϕ (ω¯et+1)
κ
(κ−1) , (4)
where κ is the elasticity of the external finance premium8 and ϕ is a scale parameter.9 This
function is such g (ω¯it) > ω¯it for positive values of κ. Ex-ante, the entrepreneur chooses
to finance a total amount of capital Ket+1 to maximize its expected profit given its biased
appreciation of projects value. Namely, it maximizes:
max
Ket+1
Et
{
ηet+1
[
g (ω¯et+1)
(
1 +Rkt+1
)
QtKet+1 −
(
1 +RLt
)
Ldet+1
]}
(5)
under the balance sheet constraint Equation 1. The first order condition which maximizes
entrepreneur’s profits reads as follows:
Et
(
1 +Rkt+1
)
(1 +RLt )
=
1
Etϕ (ω¯et+1)
κ
(κ−1)
. (6)
Using the characteristics of the Pareto distribution with ω¯et+1 = κ/ (κ− 1)ωCet+1 and substi-
tuting the threshold ωCet+1 from Equation 2, the expected spread St = Et
(
1 +Rkt+1
)
/
(
1 +RLt
)
8The elasticity of the external finance premium expresses the degree of bias in estimating the expected
rentability of entrepreneurs’ projects such that g (ω¯it) > ω¯it for κ > 0. Assuming an optimistic expectation
bias, then Eoptt ω¯t+1 = Etϕ (ω¯t+1)
κ/(κ−1)
where Eoptt is the expectation operator of optimistic entrepreneurs.
9This parameter is needed to make the steady state independent of κ ,such that ϕ = ω¯1/(1−κ).
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required by the representative entrepreneur e to undertake the decision to finance physical
capital firms is:
St = ϕ
κ−1
[
κ
κ− 1
(
Ldet+1
QtKet+1
)]κ
. (7)
The size of the accelerator is determined by the elasticity of the external finance premium
κ. For κ > 0, the external finance premium is a positive function of the leverage ratio,
Ldet+1/QtKet+1, so that an increase in net wealth NWet+1 induces a decrease in the external
finance premium St. This phenomenon disappears if κ = 0. As the profitability of capital
is a cost for the intermediate sector, a variation in the net wealth for κ > 0 has aggregate
consequences on goods supply through the channel of capital markets. If the number
of new firms increases, entrepreneurs borrow more to financial intermediaries which rises
the external finance premium and the cost of capital for all installed firms. The relation
obtained in Equation 7 can also be interpreted as a borrowing limit stating that the higher
is the external finance premium the lower is the amount that can be borrowed.
The net wealth of the entrepreneur in the next period is equal to:
NWet+1 = (1− δ) (1− θ) dEet + TEe , (8)
where dEet is the one-period profit, T
E
e is a constant net wealth transfer to new generation of
entrepreneurs,10 δ is the net wealth decay that is related to the exogenous exit rate shock
of firms and θ represents the entrepreneur’s dividends policy, i.e. the share of dividends
distributed to shareholders (while the remaining fraction 1−θ is reinvested in physical cap-
ital the next period).11 Combining Equation 3 and Equation 2, entrepreneurial dividends
are given by:
dEet = ηet
(
ω¯et − ωCet
) (
1 +Rkt
)
Qt−1Keteε
N
t . (9)
where εNt is an exogenous collateral shock which affects both the net wealth accumulation
process and the entrepreneurial dividends.
3.2 Financial intermediaries
Financial intermediaries provide funds to entrepreneurs. The representative financial inter-
mediary b ∈ [0, 1] collects deposits from households and lends to firms. From the balance
sheet of the financial intermediary, the loan supply is equal to the deposits as follows:
Lbt+1 = Bbt+1. (10)
In this expression, Lbt is the total level of loans supplied by financial intermediary b, Bbt
is the total level of deposit services offered by financial intermediary b to households. The
10This assumption is taken from Faia (2007). Since entrepreneurs are also hit by a an exogenous exit
shock δ, this transfer to new generations of entrepreneur ensures new entrepreneurs have a non-zero amount
of collateral at beginning of the next period. Transfers TE are determined endogenously in steady state
via: TE = (1− δ) (1− θ) d¯E −NW .
11This dividend policy is deemed necessary to make the system response of the model consistent with
the data. The macroeconomic implications of the entrepreneur dividend policy are further detailed in the
paper.
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representative financial intermediary sets the rate of interest RLbt and remunerates deposits
by the interest rate Rt controlled by the central bank.
Financial intermediaries finance heterogeneous investment projects conducted by en-
trepreneurs. Following Bernanke et al. (1999) and Poutineau and Vermandel (2015), if
the borrower’s project is gainful, the representative financial intermediary obtains RLbtLbt+1
with a probability ηt+1, whereas if the entrepreneur’s project is insolvent, the financial inter-
mediary must pay auditing costs µB to recover the non-profitable investment project (i.e.,(
1− µB)ωt+1/ωCt+1RLbtLbt+1)12 with a probability 1− ηt+1. In this setting, we assume that
there is no discrimination between borrowers, so that the representative and risk-neutral
financial intermediary serves all entrepreneurs without taking into account specificities re-
garding the viability of projects. Thereby the expected value of next period earnings is:
EtΠBbt+1 = Et
{
ηt+1 + (1− µB) (1− ηt+1) ωt+1
ωCt+1
}(
1 +RLbt
)
Lbt+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Revenues from loan supply activities
− (1 +Rt)Bbt+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
deposit cost
. (11)
As in Gerali et al. (2010), we take into account the imperfect pass-through of the policy rate
on financial intermediary lending rate. We suppose that financial intermediaries set their
interest rates on a staggered basis with some degree of nominal rigidity a` la Rotemberg
(1982). To introduce nominal rigidities, we assume financial intermediaries solve a two-stage
problem. In a first stage, intermediaries evaluate the marginal cost of credit on perfectly
competitive financial markets. The determination of interest rate on loans is as follows: the
representative financial intermediary b maximizes expected profit from Equation 11 with
respect to Lbt+1 to obtain the expression of the marginal cost of producing new loans:
1 +MCLbt =
(1 +Rt)
Et
{
ηt+1 + (1− µB) (1− ηt+1) ωt+1ωCt+1
} . (12)
In a second stage, financial intermediaries set their credit rate on a monopolistically com-
petitive market with some degree of nominal rigidity. The Rotemberg adjustment cost
function is given by:
ACLbt =
κL
2
(
RLbt
RLbt−1
− 1
)2
RLbt (13)
where κL denotes the cost for the representative bank of adjusting its interest rate. The
representative financial intermediary sets the lending rate by solving:
max
{RLbt}
Et
{ ∞∑
τ=0
βτ
λct+τ
λct
[
RLbtLbt+1+τ −MCLbt+τLbt+1+τ − ACLbtLdt+1
]}
, (14)
where βτλct+τ/λ
c
t is the household stochastic discount factor (see subsection 4.1 for further
explanations). Given the imperfect competition on this market, financial intermediaries
12From the financial intermediary perspective, the expected value of investment projects in case
of default is ωt+1 = E
(
ω|ω < ωCt+1)
)
. The total value of defaulting investment projects is thus,
(1− ηt+1)ωt+1Rkt+1QtKt+1. Recall that the cut-off investment project is ωt+1Rkt+1QtKt+1 = RLt Lt+1, then
the total value of investment project the bank can size in case of default is (1− ηt+1)ωt+1/ωCt+1RLbtLbt+1.
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provide differentiated loan types, sold to perfectly competitive loan packers who assemble
them in a CES aggregator and sell the homogenous loan to entrepreneurs. Considering
monopolistic competition as in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977):13
Lbt+1 =
(
RLbt/R
L
t
)−µLt /(µLt −1) Ldt+1, (15)
where µLt denotes is a time-varying mark-up defined by µ
L
t = exp
(
εLt
)
L/ (L − 1). In
this expression, L denotes the degree of imperfect substitutability between different loan
types and εLt is an exogenous AR(1) mark-up shock to the credit rate equation. Finally
anticipating symmetry between financial intermediaries, the interest rate that solves the
optimization problem for the financial intermediary reads as follows:
RLt = µ
L
tMC
L
bt −
(
µLt − 1
)
RLt
(
∂ACLbt
∂RLt
+ βEt
{
λct+1
λct
∂ACLbt+1
∂RLt
Ldt+2
Lbt+1
})
(16)
The real lending rate is thus defined by, 1 + rLt =
(
1 +RLt
)
/EtpiCt+1.
4 The Rest of the Model
This section is devoted to a formal presentation of the non-financial part of the model
summarized in Figure 1. we successively provide details regarding decisions undertaken by
households, labour-unions, the productive sector, the authorities and the general equilib-
rium conditions of the economy.
4.1 Households
There is a continuum of identical households who consume, save and work in intermediate
firms. The total number of households is normalized to 1. The the welfare index of the
representative household j ∈ [0, 1] is defined as:
Wjt = Et
{ ∞∑
τ=0
βτ
[
(Cjt+τ − hCt−1+τ )1−σC
1− σC − χ
H
1+σH
jt+τ
1 + σH
]}
, (17)
where variable Cjt is the consumption index, h ∈ [0, 1] is a parameter that accounts for
external consumption habits, Hjt is labour effort, β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor and
χ > 0 is a shift parameter in the utility function. The representative household allocates
total consumption Ct between a total number of nt goods, denoted Cit, bundled by the
final sector. The CES consumption bundle and the corresponding consumption price index
are defined as, Ct = (
∫ nt
0
Cit
P−1
P di)
P
P−1 and PCt = (
∫ nt
0
Pit
1−P di)
1
1−P , where P > 1 is the
13Loan packers are perfectly competitive and maximize profits, RLt L
d
t+1−
∫ 1
0
RLbtLbt+1db, subject to
the supply technology Lt+1 = (
∫ 1
0
(Lbt+1(b))
1/µLt db)µ
L
t . The loan demand functions associated with this
problem are, Lbt+1 =
(
RLbt/R
L
t
)−µLt /(µLt −1) Ldt+1, where Ldt+1 is in equilibrium the aggregate demand for
loans from entrepreneurs.
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elasticity of substitution between different varieties produced by firms. The consumption
of a given type i final goods is:
Cit =
(
Pit/P
C
t
)−P Ct. (18)
The budget constraint for the representative household can be expressed as:
whtHjt + e
εBt−1 (1 +Rt−1)
Bjt
PCt
+ (1− δ) (djt + vjt + θdEjt) (xjt + eεEt−1 (1− ACEjt−1)nEjt−1)
= Cjt +
Bjt+1
PCt
+ vtxjt+1 + n
E
jtfEmc
E
t + Tjt − ΠWjt − ΠBjt.
(19)
The income of the representative household is made of labour income (with desired real wage
wht ),
14 trade-unions ΠWjt and banks Π
B
jt profits generated by the imperfect competition, and
investment opportunities in three asset types: riskless nominal deposits Bjt, share holdings
xjt and new firms n
E
jt. The expenditure side includes deposit services Bjt+1, consumption
Cjt, shares purchase xjt+1 at a market price vt, investment in new startups n
E
jtfEmc
E
t (where
nEjt is the number of new entering firms, fE is a fixed entry cost and mc
E
t is the marginal
cost incurred by entering firms) and government taxes Tjt. Finally, following Smets and
Wouters (2007) for physical capital, we add a stochastic shock εEt to the free entry condition
which accounts for exogenous factors preventing a new firm from entering the market.
Concerning household’s investment opportunities, Bjt stands for the risk-free deposits
subscribed in period t − 1 and Rt−1 is the gross nominal rate of interest between period
t− 1 an period t. As in Smets and Wouters (2007), the profitability of deposits is affected
by an exogenous AR(1) premium shock εBt which aims at catching exogenous changes in
households consumption expenditures. Second, households can also invest in startups (new
firms) or existing firms. Previously financed startups nEjt−1 as well as shares purchased in
the previous period pay a dividend PCt djt from firms and θd
E
jt from entrepreneurs and are
worth (1− δ)PCt vt at the end of period t. Parameter θ denotes the fraction of entrepreneurs
profits distributed to shareholders, while the remaining fraction 1− θ is reinvested in new
investment projects. Each period all firms are affected by an exogenous exit shock δ which
affects both entering and existing firms as in Bilbiie et al. (2007). Thus, the law of motion
of firms in the economy is:
njt = (1− δ)
(
njt−1 + eε
E
t−1
(
1− ACEjt−1
)
nEjt−1
)
. (20)
The creation of new firms nEjt is costly: households must invest an amount fEmc
E
t to
create an endogenous number nEjt of new firms, where mc
E
t denotes the marginal cost of
producing a new firm and fE is a sunk cost in the creation process of startups.
15 The
number of firms entering is also affected by an exogenous shock process εEt which aims at
capturing exogenous factors allowing (preventing) a new firm to enter the market in case
of positive (negative) realization. Following Lewis and Poilly (2012), we assume that not
14The households delegates the wage negotiation process to a representative trade union which negotiates
the margin between the households desired wage wht and the real marginal product of labour of firms wt.
The trade union is detailed below in the next section.
15The creation of new firms/goods is detailed below in the production sector section.
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all startups are successful. A fraction ACEjt−1 of firms does not succeed in starting their
business. The failure probability of startups is specified as:
ACEjt =
χE
2
(
nEjt
nEjt−1
− 1
)2
. (21)
This function reflects congestion costs experienced by firms when many of them enter
simultaneously the goods market. This cost aims at smoothing the dynamics of entry over
the business cycle.16
Substituting the lagrange multipliers, we find the first order conditions that solve the
household optimisation problem. First, the marginal utility of consumption is determined
by:17
λct = (Cjt − hCt−1)−σC . (22)
The Euler deposit condition on deposits, which determines the optimal consumption path,
is:
βEt
{
λct+1
λct
}
eε
B
t
(1 +Rt)
EtpiCt+1
= 1. (23)
The Euler equation on share, which drives the share value vt, is determined by:
vt = (1− δ) βEt
{
λct+1
λct
(
djt+1 + vjt+1 + θd
E
jt+1
)}
. (24)
Put in a recursive form, the current value of shares is equal to the discounted sum of
dividends as in the standard corporate finance theory. A positive value of θ affects the share
price through the expected soundness of the financial system. Thus large negative financial
shocks, such as the financial crisis episode, affect the expected dividends of entrepreneurs,
which in turn drives down both the share price and the creation of new firms.
The first order condition determines the household labour supply:
λctw
h
t = χH
σH
jt . (25)
Finally, the free entry equation is determined by the maximization of the household problem
with respect to nEjt. Rearranged with the Euler share (Equation 24), the following expression
for the free entry condition emerges:
fEmc
E
t = vt
∂
(
1− ACEjt
)
nEjt
∂nEjt
eε
E
t + βEt
{
vt+1
∂
(
1− ACEjt+1
)
∂nEjt
nEjt+1e
εEt+1
}
. (26)
As in Bilbiie et al. (2007), entry occurs until the firm value is equalized with the entry
cost fEmc
E
t , leading to the free entry condition. The free entry condition is also affected
by the probability of failure ACEjt because of congestion costs faced by the new firms when
entering the market. Assuming a zero congestion cost function such that χE = 0, the free
entry condition is the same as in Bilbiie et al. (2007).
16The convex functional form is directly borrowed from the investment cost function of Christiano et al.
(2005).
17In equilibrium, the marginal utility of consumption equals the lagrange multiplier λct associated to the
household budget constraint.
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4.2 Labour Unions
In our setting, wages are sticky. To single out the determination and the dynamics of
nominal wages, we assume that households delegate the task of negotiating their salary to
labour unions. Formally, households provide differentiated types of labour, sold by labour
unions to perfectly competitive labour packers who assemble them in a CES aggregator and
sell the homogenous labour to intermediate firms.18 Each representative union is related
to a household j ∈ [0, 1]. We introduce Rotemberg (1982) adjustment costs into the wage
setting equation with quadratic wage adjustment costs:
ACWjt =
κW
2
(
Wjt
Wjt−1
− [ξWpiCt−1 + (1− ξW )])2 WjtPt , (27)
where ξW is a parameter measuring the rate of wage indexation between periods.
19 Given
this adjustment cost function, the optimization problem becomes dynamic. The represen-
tative union set the wage Wjt by maximizing its expected margin between the firm’s real
labour marginal product and the household desired wage:
max
{Wjt}
Et
{ ∞∑
τ=0
βτ
λct+τ
λct
(
Wjt+τ
Pt+τ
Hdjt+τ −
W hjt+τ
Pt+τ
Hdjt+τ − ACWjt+τHt+τ
)}
, (28)
subject to the downgrade sloping demand constraint from labour packers:
Hjt = (Wjt/Wt)
−µWt /(µWt −1)Ht, (29)
where Hjt denotes the quantity of differentiated labour types j used in the labour packer
production function with a time-varying mark-up µWt =
W
W−1 exp
(
εWt
)
. Parameter W
denotes the degree of imperfect substitutability between different labour varieties supplied
by households.
Anticipating symmetry over labour unions, the first order condition results in the fol-
lowing equation real wage equation:
Wt
PCt
= µWt
W ht
PCt
− (µWt − 1)Wt [ACW ′t + βEt{λct+1λct Ht+1Ht ACW ′t+1
}]
. (30)
4.3 Production
4.3.1 The Intensive Margin
This sector is populated by two groups of agents: intermediate firms and final firms. In-
termediate firms produce differentiated goods i, choose labour and capital inputs, and set
18labour packers are perfectly competitive and maximize profits, WtHt−
∫ 1
0
WjtHjtdj, subject to the
supply technology Ht = (
∫ 1
0
(Hjt
1/µWt )dj)µ
W
t . The labour demand functions associated with this problem
are, Hjt = (Wjt/Wt)
−µWt /(µWt −1)Ht, where Ht is in equilibrium the aggregate demand from firms.
19Empirically accounting for ξW is necessary to fix the persistency of wage rigidity encountered in the
data.
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prices according to the Rotemberg (1982) model. Final goods producers act as a consump-
tion bundler by combining national intermediate goods to produce the homogenous final
good.20
Each representative intermediate firm i ∈ [0, nt] is related to an entrepreneur e. Each
firm has the following technology:
Yit = e
εAt
(
Kuit+1
)α (
Hdit
)1−α
, (31)
where Yit is the production function of the intermediate good that combines capital K
u
it+1,
21
labour demand Hdit and technology e
εAt (an AR(1) productivity shock). Assuming capital
requires one period to be settled and uit denotes the capital utilization rate, the utilized
capital involved in the production is reads:
Kuit+1 = uitKit (32)
Intermediate goods producers solve a two-stage problem. In the first stage, taken real
input prices wt and zt as given, firms rent inputs H
d
it and K
u
it+1 in a perfectly competitive
factor markets in order to minimize costs subject to the production constraint.22 The first
order condition leads to the real marginal cost expression:
mcit = mct =
1
eε
A
t
(zt
α
)α( wt
(1− α)
)(1−α)
. (33)
From the cost minimization problem, relative input demand must also satisfies,
αHditwt = (1− α)Kuit+1zt. (34)
In the second-stage, the intermediate firm operates monopolistically and sets the retail
price according to a Rotemberg (1982) technology. Intermediate-good firms face adjustment
costs on price changes, ACPit defined according to,
ACPit =
κP
2
(
Pit
Pit−1
− [ξPpit−1 + (1− ξP )]
)2
Pit
PCt
, (35)
where κP is the cost of adjusting prices and ξP is the coefficient that measures the rate
of indexation to past rate of inflation of intermediate goods, pit−1 = Pt−1/Pt−2. Given
this price adjustment cost specification, the problem of the representative firms becomes
dynamic:
max
{Pit}
Et
{ ∞∑
τ=0
βτ
λct+τ
λct
(
Pit+τ
PCt+τ
−mcit+τ − ACPit+τ
)
Yit+τ
}
. (36)
20Final good producers are perfectly competitive and maximize profits, PCt Y
d
t −
∫ nt
0
PitYitdi, subject to
the production function Y dt = (
∫ nt
0
(
Yit
(P−1)/P ))P /(P−1). The intermediate demand functions associated
with this problem are, Yit =
(
Pit/P
C
t
)−P
Y dt , where Y
d
t is the aggregate demand.
21The capital utilization rate is determined below in the capital supplier’s section.
22Each firm solves minKuit+1,Hdit wtH
d
it + ztK
u
it+1 under the supply constraint.
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Firms operate in a monopolistically competitive market as in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977).
Hence, the amount of firm-specific output, Yit, is demand-determined in response to its
relative price Pit/P
C
t and to the aggregate demand for goods, Y
d
t , as follows,
Yit =
(
Pit
PCt
)−P
Y dt . (37)
Here P > 1 is the constant elasticity of substitution across goods. Anticipating symmetry
and maximizing the expected stream of profits Equation 36 under the downward sloping
constraint Equation 37, the first order conditions imply an optimal pricing policy such that
the relative price ρit = Pit/P
C
t is set as a mark-up over the marginal cost of production:
ρit = µitmcit, (38)
where the endogenous mark-up µit is defined as:
µit = e
εPt
P
(P − 1)
(
1− PCt
Pit
ACPit
)
+ κPΨit
. (39)
Here εPt is an ad hoc mark-up shock process (i.e., a positive realization of ε
P
t reduces the
cost of adjusting prices, thus inducing a stronger inflation pressure) and Ψit is an auxiliary
variable that depends on the Rotemberg (1982)-type cost of price adjustment.23
Finally, the profit of firms i in real terms is given by:
dit =
(
ρit −mcit − ACPit
)
Yit. (40)
4.3.2 The Extensive Margin
Setting up new firms requires labour services. Each period, a continuum of new firms
indexed z ∈ [0, nEt ] decides to enter the market. The production of new goods follows the
same technology as Bilbiie et al. (2007):
fE = e
εAt HEzt (41)
Considering perfect cross-sectoral factor mobility between intensive and extensive sectors,
the cost of one unit of labour Wt is the same across sectors. To introduce a financial friction
in the production process of new firms, we incorporate a wage-bill in advance constraint.24
More precisely, entrepreneurs finance a fraction γ ∈ [0, 1] of the wage bill for the creation
of new goods. As a result, the zth firm must borrow its wage bill, WtH
E
zt, from the financial
intermediary at the beginning of period t. Repayment occurs at the end of the period at
the gross interest rate, 1 + γRLt . The introduction of a wage bill in advance constraint is
empirically motivated, for example Aghion et al. (2007) find that access to finance matters
23Specifically, Ψit = (pit − [ξPpit−1 + (1− ξP )])pit − βEt λ
c
t+1
λct
(
(pit − [ξPpit−1 + (1− ξP )])pit+1 Yit+1Yit
)
.
24This assumption is close to the standard cash-in-advance constraint as in Lucas Jr and Stokey (1985).
Such constraints were extended to wage bill or capital services bill, see for example Christiano et al. (2005).
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most for the entry of small firms and in sectors that are more dependent upon external
finance.
The cost minimization problem leads to the real marginal cost expression for the pro-
duction of a new good z:
mcEzt = mc
E
t =
wt
(
1 + γrLt
)
eε
A
t
. (42)
For γ > 0, the variation of the lending rate affects the decision to enter. In period of low
lending rates, entrepreneurs have incentives to finance new goods’ creation and generates
positive extensive margins while in period of high financial distress characterized by impor-
tant lending rate spreads, the financial constraint is too important to finance new firms,
which negatively affects output.
The presence of financial frictions complicates the computation of the steady state. In
our setting, financial frictions clearly affect the steady state number of firms (n¯) that is
given by:
n¯ = H¯
[
(1− (1− δ) β) fE (1− α)
(
1 + γr¯L
)
(1− δ) β ((µ¯− 1) + dK α
z¯
) + fE δ
(1− δ)
]−1
, (43)
where terms with a bar denotes the steady state value of the relevant variable and dK =
θη¯ω¯C (κ− 1)−1 (1 + r¯k). However, it should be noted that assuming there are no financial
frictions such that, γ = θ = 0, the number of firms is the same as Bilbiie et al. (2007). This
aspect is furthermore discussed in subsubsection B.2.2.
4.4 Capital Suppliers
Capital suppliers are homogeneous and distributed over a continuum normalized to one.
The representative capital supplier k ∈ [0, 1] acts competitively to supply a quantity Kkt+1
of capital. Investment is costly, i.e. the capital supplier pays an adjustment cost ACIkt on
investment, such that ACIkt =
χI
2
(Ikt/Ikt−1 − 1)2. The capital stock of the representative
capital supplier thus evolves according to:
Kkt+1 = e
εIt
(
1− ACIkt
)
Ikt + (1− δ)Kkt, (44)
where εIt is an exogenous adjustment cost shock on investment which drives a wedge between
the shadow value of capital Qt and the consumption price index P
C
t (put differently, the
real shadow value of capital qt = Qt/P
C
t is non-constant for χI 6= 0)The capital supplier
produces the new capital stock qtKkt+1 by buying the depreciated capital qt (1− δ)Kkt and
investment goods Ikt. The representative capital supplier chooses Ikt to maximize profits:
max
{Ikt}
Et
{ ∞∑
τ=0
βτ
λct+τ
λct
[
Qte
εIt
(
1− ACIkt
)− 1] Ikt} , (45)
where βτλct+τ/λ
c
t is the household stochastic discount factor presented in Equation 22. The
real price of capital renting thus solves:
εIt qt = 1 + e
εIt qt
∂
(
IktAC
I
kt
)
∂Ikt
+ βEt
{
λct+1
λct
eε
I
t+1piCt+1qt+1
∂
(
Ikt+1AC
I
kt+1
)
∂Ikt
}
. (46)
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For capital utilization decisions, we follow Smets and Wouters (2007) assuming that the
cost of adjusting the utilization rate ut of capital is given by:
Φ (ut) = (1− ψ) /ψZ¯ (exp [ψ/ (1− ψ) (ut − 1)]− 1) ,
where ψ is the utilization cost elasticity, Z¯ is the steady state marginal product of capital.
Since in the steady state the utilization rate is normalized, u¯ = 1, then Φ (u) = 0 and
Φ′ (u) = Z¯ . The optimal utilization rate of capital is determined by:25
zt = Z¯e
ψ/(1−ψ)(ut−1), (47)
where zt = Zt/P
C
t is the real marginal product of capital. The profitability of one unit of
capital is:26
1 + rkt =
ztut − Φ (ut) + (1− δ) qt
qt−1
. (48)
4.5 Authorities
The government finances public spending by charging a tax on households. The total
amount of public spending, PtGt, is assumed to evolve according to an AR(1) exoge-
nous shock process PtG¯ε
G
t and accounts for both government spending shocks and exter-
nal shocks which alters the trade balance. The balance sheet of government is given by,
PCt G¯ε
G
t =
∫ 1
0
Tjtdj.
The central bank reacts to fluctuations of price and activity imbalances. The general
expression of the linear interest rule implemented by the central bank can be expressed as:
Rt−R¯ = ρ
(
Rt−1 − R¯
)
+(1− ρR)
[
φpi (pit − 1) + φY
(
Yt − Y¯
)]
+φ∆Y (Yt − Yt−1)+εRt , (49)
where εRt is an exogenous AR(1) monetary policy shock, φ
pi, φY and φ∆Y denote respectively
the inflation, output gap and GDP growth gap parameters which aim at stabilizing the
economy when deviating from its steady state.
4.6 Shocks, Aggregation and Equilibrium conditions
In this model, there are 10 structural shock processes defined by, εst = ρsε
s
t−1 + η
s
t , s =
{A,G,B, I, P,W,L,E,N,R} and where ρs are autoregressive roots of the exogenous vari-
ables, ηst , are standard errors that are mutually independent, serially uncorrelated and nor-
mally distributed with zero mean and variances σ2s . Following Smets and Wouters (2007),
we augment the price and wage AR(1) shock processes with an MA(1) term, denoted um,
such that:
εmt = ρmε
m
t−1 + η
m
t − umηmt−1, for m = P,W. (50)
25The problem faced by capital suppliers when choosing the optimal utilization rate is :
minut P
C
t Φ (ut)Kt − ZtutKt.
26The real unit of one unit of capital is micro-founded when the household takes the capital supply
decisions. To improve the clarity of the model presentation, we decentralized the capital supply decisions
to the capital supplier as in Bernanke et al. (1999).
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The MA(1) term aims at catching high frequency fluctuations observed in price and wage
time series. Finally we also follow Smets and Wouters (2007) assuming that the spending
shock is affected by the productivity innovation in a proportion ρAG:
εGt = ρGε
G
t−1 + η
G
t + ρAGη
A
t . (51)
After (i) aggregating all agents and varieties in the economy, (ii) imposing market
clearing on all markets and (iii) substituting the relevant demand functions, the resource
constraint for the economy, also defined as the GDP through the demand approach, reads
as follows:
Y dt = Ct + It + G¯ε
G
t + Φ (ut)Kt−1 + ntAC
P
t Yt + AC
W
t Ht + AC
L
t Lt+1 (52)
Using the goods packer zero profit condition presented in subsection 4.3, the consumption
price index is determined by, PCt = (
∫ nt
0
P 1−Pit di)
1/(1−P ). Rearranging this expression, the
following expression for the relative price ρt = Pt/P
C
t emerges:
ntρ
(1−P )
t = 1. (53)
We can deduct the inflation rate piCt from ρt:
ρt
ρt−1
=
pit
piCt
. (54)
Aggregating total demand in Equation 37 for all varieties nt supplied by the economy leads
to the clearing market condition for goods:27
ntYt = ρ
−P
t Y
d
t (55)
Concerning the production sector, we aggregate input factor capital services (Kut+1 =∫ nt
0
Kuit+1di) and labour demand of installed firms (H
d
t =
∫ nt
0
Hditdi) and startups (H
E
t =∫ nEt
0
HEztdz). Aggregate supply in the economy follows:
ntYt = e
εAt
(
Kut+1
)α (
Hdt
)1−α
and nEt fE = e
εAt HEt . (56)
Turning to the labour market, the market clearing condition between households labour
supply and demands from installed and new firms is:
Ht = H
d
t +H
E
t . (57)
Concerning the profit aggregation of Equation 40 and Equation 9, letting Kt+1 denote∫ nt
0
Kit+1di, the return from holding one fraction of shares xjt is:
dt =
(
ρt −mct − ACPt
)
Yt and ntd
E
t = ηt
(
ω¯t − ωCt
) (
1 +Rkt
)
Qt−1Kteε
N
t . (58)
Finally the general equilibrium condition is defined as a sequence of quantities {Qt}∞t=0
and prices {Pt}∞t=0 such that for a given sequence of quantities {Qt}∞t=0 and the realization
of shocks {St}∞t=0, the sequence {Pt}∞t=0, guarantees the simultaneous equilibrium on all
markets previously defined.
27The aggregation of all varieties reads:
∫ nt
0
Yit = ntYt.
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5 Estimation
Our empirical approach is a synthesis of the canonical estimation method of New Keynesian
models of Smets and Wouters (2007), augmented with financial series as in Christiano
et al. (2014) and combined with entry as in Lewis and Stevens (2015). We apply standard
Bayesian estimation techniques as in Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007). In this section, we
describe the data sources and transformations, before turning to our choice of priors and
to the posterior distributions of the model parameters.
5.1 Data
The model is estimated with Bayesian methods on US quarterly data over the sample time
period 1993Q1 to 2012Q3. Our sample is rather short because, as pointed out by Lewis
and Stevens (2015), samples on business establishments are discontinued and short. We
consider here the sample of Sadeghi (2008) as it spans over the 2007 financial turmoil, which
is a key event in our analysis. The rest of the data are the same as Smets and Wouters
(2007) (seven times series) and Christiano et al. (2014) (two financial time series)28 and
are available on the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis website.
Concerning the transformation of series, the point is to map non-stationary data to
a stationary model (namely, the GDP, consumption, investment and loan supply). Data
which are known to have a trend or unit root are made stationary in two steps. First,
we divide the sample by the population. Second, data are taken in logs and we use a first
difference filtering to obtain growth rates. Real variables are deflated by GDP deflator price
index. Following Chang et al. (2002), who underline the limited coverage of the nonfarm
business sector compared to GDP, we multiply the index of average hours for the nonfarm
business sector (all persons) by civilian employment.
Finally, we demean the data because we do not incorporate trends in our model. We
are aware that the introduction of trends could affect our estimation results. However for
tractability reasons, we have chosen to focus on short run macroeconomic fluctuations and
to neglect long run effects involved by trends. Such an approach has also been chosen by
Lewis and Stevens (2015) for a similar fit exercise on firms’ entry.
The final dataset includes ten times series: real per capita growth rate of the GDP ∆Ŷrlt ,
consumption ∆Ĉrlt , investment ∆Îrlt , and loans ∆L̂rlt , as well as the quarterly federal funds
rate Rt (divided by 4 to be on a quarterly basis), the quarterly corporate bond spread St,
the inflation rate ∆Pˆt, the real inflation rate of wages ∆Ŵrt , the per capita amount of hours
worked in logs Ĥlt and the effective share of entry N̂Et . Figure 3 plots the transformed data.
Letting Xrt , X
l
t and X̂t denote the real, the per capita and the log value of Xt respectively,
the vector of observable can be summarized by:
yobst =
[
∆Ŷrlt ∆Ĉrlt ∆Îrlt Ĥlt ∆Pˆt ∆Ŵrt Rt/4 St/4 ∆L̂rlt N̂Et
]′
, (59)
28More particularly for financial time series, we use commercial and industrial loans, and Moody’s
seasoned Baa corporate bond minus federal funds rate.
20
1995 2000 2005 2010
−2
−1
0
1
pProductionp
1995 2000 2005 2010
−2
0
pConsumptionp
1995 2000 2005 2010
−5
0
pInvestmentp
1995 2000 2005 2010
−5
0
5
pHoursp
1995 2000 2005 2010
−0.5
0
0.5
pInflationp
1995 2000 2005 2010
−2
0
2
pReal Wagesp
1995 2000 2005 2010
−5
0
pNominal Ratep
1995 2000 2005 2010
−0.5
0
0.5
1
pCorporate Bond Spreadp
1995 2000 2005 2010
−5
0
5
pLoansp
1995 2000 2005 2010
−10
0
pEntryp
Figure 3: Observable variables used in the estimation
To make the model and the data consistent, we assume xˆt = log(Xt/X¯) denotes the log-
deviation of Xt from the steady state. Measurement equations read as follows:
yt =
[
∆yˆdt ∆cˆt ∆ıˆt hˆt pˆi
C
t ∆wˆt Rt
1+RLt
1+Rt
∆lˆt
1
1−δ∆nˆt
]′
, (60)
5.2 Calibration and Prior Distribution of Parameters
We fix a small number of parameters commonly used in the literature of real business cycle
models which are either standard or weakly identified. The discount factor is β = 0.992,
which delivers an annual real riskless rate of 3.2%. The depreciation rate of capital (or
exit rate) is as Bilbiie et al. (2007), δ = 0.025. Following Smets and Wouters (2007), the
elasticity of substitution between different labour varieties is set at W = 3, implying a
wage mark-up of 50% while for the analogous parameter for price is set at P = 3.8 as
in Bilbiie et al. (2007) and delivers a mark-up of 35%. We calibrate the capital share
α = 0.40 and the sunk cost fE = 5 in order to obtain a steady state investment-to-GDP
ratio close to 16% while we follow Smets and Wouters (2007) by setting the spending-to-
GDP ratio to 18%, G¯/Y¯ = 0.18. Households are assumed to spend 33% of their time
working with H¯ = 1/3. We calibrate the corporate bond spread as observed in the sample
period,
(
1 + r¯L
)
/ (1 + r¯) = 1 + 0.98/100. Following Bernanke et al. (1999), the steady
state entrepreneurs’ default rate is set at 2.5% on an annual basis, 1 − η¯ = 2.5/400,
while the leverage ratio is set at 50%, L¯/K¯ = 0.50. From the previous calibration, we
can deduct the parameters of the Pareto distribution. Recall that following the Pareto
distribution ω ∼ P (κ;ωmin) where κ is the shape parameter and ωmin the minimum value
of ω ∈ [ωmin; +∞). To obtain the value of ωmin and κ, we solve the model’s steady state
assuming frictionless financial markets (i.e., ω¯C = ωmin and r¯
k = r¯L)29. From Equation 2 in
frictionless equilibrium, we find ωmin = L¯/K¯, while the first order condition of Equation 3
implies κ = 1/ (1− ωmin). From this, it is straightforward to compute r¯k, and mcL and
ω¯C . Our calibration delivers a steady state substitutability elasticity for loans close to 1.9,
29In our set-up, ω¯C denotes the endogenous risk in the economy. When ωC hits the lower bound (ω¯C =
ωmin), the economy is riskless implying r¯
k = r¯L so that when ω¯C > ωmin there are financial frictions and
defaulting entrepreneurs projects in steady state.
21
this value is lower than the findings of Gerali et al. (2010). Finally for γ the fraction of the
wage bill financed in advance, no corresponding estimate is available with precision in the
literature. Thus, we calibrate it so as to replicate some dynamic properties of entry with
γ = 1 (i.e. a negative response of entry after a credit rate increase).
Our priors are listed in Table 1 and Table 2. Overall, they are either consistent with the
previous literature or relatively uninformative. For a majority of new Keynesian models’
parameters, i.e. σC , h, ξP , ξW , χI , ψ, φpi, φY , φ∆Y , ρ, uP , uW , ρAG and shocks processes pa-
rameters ρs and standard deviations of innovations σs for s = {A,G,B, I, P,W,L,E,N,R},
we use the prior distributions chosen by Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007). We depart from
the canonical priors’ specification of Smets and Wouters on two aspects to be empirically
relevant with the data. First, the labour disutility parameter σH should remain below 1
as in the first generation of RBC models in order to dampen the response of hours and
entry (especially after a monetary shock). The second aspect also aims at dampening hours
worked and entry responses, assuming that nominal rigidities for wages are largely higher
than for prices. This assumption is empirically motivated as exemplified for example by
the estimated results of Smets and Wouters (2007) for the US economy. For the curvature
of labour utility, we impose a beta distribution with mean 0.50 and standard deviation
0.10. The Rotemberg price and wage adjustment cost parameters κP and κW are assumed
to be 50 and 70 respectively with a common standard deviation of 5. These values are
consistent with both Gerali et al. (2010) and Lewis and Stevens (2015). Our priors for the
Rotemberg adjustment cost for credit rates is close to Gerali et al. (2010) with a mean
of 10 and a standard deviation of 2.5. We set the prior for the elasticity of the external
finance premium κ to a normal distribution with prior mean equal to 0.05 and standard
deviation 0.02 consistent with the benchmark calibration of Bernanke et al. (1999). For the
auditing cost µB, our prior is inspired by Christiano et al. (2014) with a mean of 0.25 and
a standard deviation of 0.05. For the entrepreneurial dividends policy parameter θ × 100,
to our knowledge there is no micro-evidence on the value of this parameter, we impose a
fairly loose prior with a diffuse normal distribution, mean and standard are set at 5 and
0.75 respectively. Finally, the adjustment cost on entry χE has a prior mean of 0.4 and a
standard deviation of 0.10, which is below the priors of Casares and Poutineau (2014) and
Lewis and Stevens (2015), but this assumption is deemed necessary to obtain a response
of entry consistent with the data.
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Figure 4: Prior and posterior distributions of structural parameters.
5.3 Posterior Estimates
The methodology is standard to the Bayesian estimations of DSGE models.30 Figure 4
reports the prior and posterior marginal densities of the parameters of the model, excluding
the standard deviation and AR and MA terms of shocks. According to Figure 4, the data
were relatively informative except for two parameters for which posterior distributions stay
very close to the chosen priors. These parameters are the inflation weight in the Taylor
rule φpi and the price adjustment cost κP . The inflation weight is commonly not well
identified as it strongly interacts with the smoothing parameter ρ (see for example An and
Schorfheide (2007)). Concerning κP , his weak identification is caused by the small size of
the sample period considered in the estimation exercise. Increasing the numbers of periods
in the sample would solve the issue, but we are constrained by the availability of entry
data.
Our results are largely in line with the estimates of Smets and Wouters (2007). Com-
paring our results for nominal rigidities with those obtained by Lewis and Stevens (2015),
the price adjustment cost estimate is slightly lower, while it is similar for the wage. Our
30The number of shocks and observable variables are the same to avoid stochastic singularity issue.
The posterior distribution combines the likelihood function with prior information. To calculate the pos-
terior distribution to evaluate the marginal likelihood of the model, the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm
is employed. To do this, a sample of 120, 000 draws was generated on 4 different chains, neglecting the
first 20, 000. The scale factor was set in order to deliver acceptance rates of between 20 and 30 percent
(here roughly 24%). Convergence was assessed by means of the multivariate convergence statistics taken
from Brooks and Gelman (1998). The estimation was performed using Dynare version 4.4.3 developed by
Adjemian et al. (2014).
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Prior distributions Posterior distribution
Shape Mean Std. Mean [5%:95%]
Structural Parameters
Consumption aversion σC N 1.5 0.37 1.41 [1.03:1.79]
Labour disutility σL G 0.5 0.1 0.68 [0.56:0.8]
Consumption inertia h B 0.7 0.1 0.63 [0.56:0.7]
Price rigidity κP N 50 5 52.9 [45.2:60.56]
Price indexation ξP B 0.5 0.15 0.26 [0.05:0.45]
Wage rigidity κW N 70 5 57.82 [48.35:66.79]
Wage indexation ξW B 0.5 0.15 0.15 [0.04:0.25]
Credit rate rigidity κL N 10 2.5 13.11 [9.19:17.09]
Investment cost χI N 4 1.5 8.05 [6.27:9.81]
Capital utilization ψ B 0.5 0.1 0.87 [0.8:0.93]
MPR inflation φpi N 1.5 0.15 1.44 [1.19:1.69]
MPR output gap φY G 0.125 0.05 0.11 [0.06:0.16]
MPR output growth φ∆Y G 0.125 0.1 0.09 [0.04:0.13]
MPR smoothing ρ B 0.75 0.1 0.87 [0.84:0.91]
Finance Premia κ B 0.05 0.02 0.21 [0.17:0.27]
Auditing cost µB B 0.25 0.05 0.07 [0.04:0.1]
Entrepreneurial dividends θ × 100 N 5 0.75 4.19 [3.22:5.21]
Entry adjustment cost χE N 0.4 0.1 0.91 [0.82:1.04]
Marginal likelihood -1128.15
Table 1: Prior and Posterior distributions of structural parameters
estimation of the external finance premium κ is twice higher than De Graeve (2008), and
even more compared to Poutineau and Vermandel (2015). This result suggests the financial
amplification mechanism is more important with entry. Our estimates of the credit rate
adjustment cost κL is slightly higher than Gerali et al. (2010) for the Euro area. Finally,
the auditing cost estimation is in line with the calibration of Bernanke et al. (1999), but is
clearly below the estimate of Christiano et al. (2014).
6 The Consequence of Financial Frictions on the Prop-
agation of Non Financial Shocks
To evaluate how financial frictions affect the dynamics of the model, we report the sim-
ulated responses of the main macroeconomic and financial variables following standard
non-financial shocks generally encountered in the literature related to the extensive margin
of activity: a positive shock to productivity, public spending, cost-push innovations and
on the monetary policy interest rate. In these experiments we contrast the reaction of the
model without (in dotted lines) and with (in plain lines) financial frictions. The description
of the diffusion of financial shocks is left to the next section.
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Prior distributions Posterior distribution
Shape Mean Std. Mean [5%:95%]
AR(1), MA(1) Term
AR - Productivity ρA B 0.5 0.2 0.99 [0.98:1.00]
AR - Spending ρG B 0.5 0.2 0.96 [0.94:0.99]
AR - Premium ρB B 0.5 0.2 0.87 [0.76:0.97]
AR - Investment ρI B 0.5 0.2 0.99 [0.99:1.00]
AR - Price cost-push ρP B 0.5 0.2 0.63 [0.37:0.87]
AR - Wage cost-push ρW B 0.5 0.2 0.99 [0.99:1.00]
AR - Rate cost-push ρL B 0.5 0.2 0.84 [0.79:0.90]
AR - Entry shock ρE B 0.5 0.2 0.43 [0.29:0.57]
AR - Collateral ρN B 0.5 0.2 0.95 [0.92:0.98]
AR - Monetary policy ρR B 0.5 0.2 0.48 [0.36:0.59]
Productivity-Spending ρAG B 0.5 0.2 0.41 [0.13:0.67]
MA - price uP B 0.5 0.2 0.35 [0.13:0.56]
MA - wage uW B 0.5 0.2 0.88 [0.84:0.92]
Innovations
Productivity ηAt IG 0.1 2 0.96 [0.82:1.09]
Spending ηGt IG 0.1 2 2.32 [2.01:2.64]
Premium ηBt IG 0.1 2 0.40 [0.23:0.58]
Investment ηIt IG 0.1 2 3.96 [3.38:4.55]
Price cost-push ηPt IG 0.1 2 0.05 [0.04:0.07]
Wage cost-push ηWt IG 0.1 2 0.27 [0.21:0.32]
Rate cost-push ηLt IG 0.1 2 0.18 [0.15:0.21]
Entry shock ηEt IG 0.1 2 2.00 [1.68:2.30]
Collateral ηNt IG 0.1 2 0.64 [0.48:0.78]
Monetary policy ηRt IG 0.1 2 0.09 [0.08:0.10]
Marginal likelihood -1128.15
Table 2: Prior and Posterior distributions of shock processes
6.1 Productivity shock
Figure 5 depicts the impulse responses of an increase in productivity on the main variables
of the model. As standardly documented in the literature, this shock lowers firms’ real
marginal costs (Equation 33). As prices are sticky and do not fall according to the same
amount, this rises markups and increases profits and firms value (Equation 40). The fall
in entry costs (measured in terms of the marginal cost of production) and the rise in firms
value lead to more entry on the goods market. In turn, the greater profitability of firms
leads investors to invest more. As time goes, prices decrease which leads to an increase
in consumption. The combination of the dynamics of the extensive margin and intensive
margin of activity imply a higher increase in GDP.
As documented by the plain line, the financial constraints - related to the need for
entrepreneurs to get loans from the banking system in order to finance investment in
existing firms and the creation of new goods’ varieties - clearly affects the dynamics of
the macroeconomic variables. Moreover, financial frictions have a dampening effect on
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the creation of new varieties, as entrepreneurs need to get loans to finance salaries during
the building of the new production lines to meet its financial constraint (Equation 1).
Furthermore, as new firms require loans, this increases the cost of firms’ creation which
limits the increase in the market value of firms. However, this contractionary effect is not
significant during the initial five periods (as one should notice both lines are the same).
As previously underlined in the presentation of the framework, entrepreneurs have to
make an arbitrage between the creation of new varieties and financing investment in existing
firms. Maintaining the flow of goods creation during the first periods after the productivity
shock leads entrepreneurs to divert financial resources from investment, and, as a conse-
quence, the positive shock on productivity implies a - seemingly counter-intuitive - decrease
in investment. This dynamics of investment has a negative impact on the intensive margin
of activity. Combining the new dynamics of the two margins of activity, we observe a
lower increase in GDP. In the meanwhile, the drop in investment and the lower increase
of consumption after 5 periods lead to a decrease in goods demand higher than in goods
supply, which reinforces the deflationary effect of the productivity shock.
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Figure 5: System response to an estimated productivity shock ηAt measured in percentage
deviations from steady state with financial frictions (plain blue) and without (dashed red).
Note: These IRFs are obtained classically by calibrating the model at the posterior
mean as reported in Table 1 and Table 2.
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6.2 Spending shock
Figure 6 depicts the impulse responses of an increase in government spending. As observed,
this shock increases the inflation rate in the economy, which erodes the real value of firms
dividends (Equation 40) and, as a consequence, the real market value of firms and firm entry
decrease. The increase in the inflation rate requires an increase in the policy rate through
the Taylor rule (Equation 49) . This in turn depresses both investment and consumption.
Thus, the increase in activity is mainly explained by the evolution of the intensive margin
with a marginal negative contribution of the extensive margin.
As reported with the plain line, financial constraints accelerate the drop in the extensive
margin of activity. Indeed, as the creation of new firms require the availability of loans
to finance the creation of new production lines, the increase in the lending interest rate
(Equation 16) reinforces the drop in the creation of new varieties. The value of firms initially
decreases more with than without financial frictions. As a consequence, entrepreneurs tend
to favour more investment in existing firms (which now becomes positive). This in turn,
helps to maintain the intensive margin of activity, with respect to the financial friction free
situation. Combining the dynamics of the intensive and extensive margin leads to a better
performance of activity, as the marginal increase in the intensive margin is higher than the
marginal negative effects of financial frictions on the extensive margin of activity.
6.3 Price mark-up shock
Figure 7 depicts the impulse responses following a positive cost push shock. In this situ-
ation, the increase in the price of goods has a positive effect on the extensive margin of
activity as this increase in selling prices makes new firms’ entry more profitable (Equa-
tion 40). In the meanwhile, as this increase in inflation leads to an increase of the policy
interest rate - through the Taylor rule (Equation 49) - it depresses investment in the econ-
omy, which has a negative effect on the intensive margin. Without financial frictions, the
decrease in the intensive margin is lower than the increase in the extensive margin, which
implies a rise in activity. This dynamics of the GDP is clearly at odds with standard
empirical results of the literature, as a positive cost push shock corresponds to a negative
supply innovation.
As observed in the Figure 7, the introduction of financial frictions are necessary to fix
this consistency problem: now, as wages need to be financed by loans, the policy rate
reaction, by making loans more expensive to subscribe, has a damaging effect on firms
creation, with respect to the friction free setting. The incentive to enter the goods market
is negatively affected by the fact that financing wages during the entering period is more
expensive for entrepreneurs. In the meanwhile, the cost of investment is also positively
affected. As a consequence, the decrease in the intensive margin of activity is amplified with
financial frictions. Combining these two novel dynamics with financial frictions reintroduces
a standard effect of the positive cost-push shock on activity by depressing both margins.
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Figure 6: System response to an estimated spending shock ηGt measured in percentage
deviations from steady state with financial frictions (plain blue) and without (dashed red).
Note: These IRFs are obtained classically by calibrating the model at the posterior
mean as reported in Table 1 and Table 2.
6.4 Monetary policy shock
Finally, Figure 8 depicts the impulse responses of an increase in the policy interest rate
(that affects the value of the interest rate shock in Equation 49). As observed financial
constraints amplify the negative effect of the shock. By raising the interest rate on loans
(Equation 16), this policy leads to a higher cost of new varieties creation, as entrepreneurs
should pay more for getting the amount necessary to finance wages in advance for the
new production lines as depicted in Equation 1. In this case, as observed, this shock
mainly affects the extensive margin of activity. As it becomes less interesting to finance
the creation of new varieties, entrepreneurs tend to favour investment in existing firms.
Thus, more financial resources are devoted to investment (the decrease in investment is
dampened by the arbitrage of entrepreneurs) which has a positive impact on the intensive
margin of activity with regards to what is observed in the financial friction free setting.
However, combining the dynamics of the extensive and intensive margins leads to more
decrease in GDP following the policy shock. As observed, the marginal increase in the
intensive margin is lower than the marginal negative effects of financial frictions on the
extensive margin of activity. Thus, financial frictions tend to amplify the negative impact
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Figure 7: System response to an estimated cost-push shock ηPt measured in percentage
deviations from steady state with financial frictions (plain blue) and without (dashed red).
Note: These IRFs are obtained classically by calibrating the model at the posterior
mean as reported in Table 1 and Table 2.
of an increase in the policy rate on activity.
7 The Propagation of Financial Shocks
This section analyses the effects of financial shocks on the entry of new firms. We first
evaluate the specific consequences of each type of financial shock (affecting the collateral
of entrepreneurs or the mark up of the banking system) on the main variables of interest of
the model using Bayesian IRFs. In a second subsection we analyse the relative contribution
of financial and non-financial shocks to the fluctuations of the extensive margin of activity
of US GDP during the sample time period running from 1993Q1 to 2012Q3.
7.1 Bayesian Impulse Response Analysis
Figure 9 and Figure 10 depict the Bayesian impulse responses of selected variables to two
financial shocks. We report the simulated responses of the main macroeconomic and finan-
cial variables following financial shocks equal in size to their standard deviation estimated
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Figure 8: System response to an estimated monetary policy shock ηRt measured in
percentage deviations from steady state with financial frictions (plain blue) and without
(dashed red).
Note: These IRFs are obtained classically by calibrating the model at the posterior
mean as reported in Table 1 and Table 2.
above. We contrast the consequences of an increase in the net worth of entrepreneurs (that
can be associated to an improvement of the stock exchange) and that of an increase in the
mark up of banking activity (which deteriorates the lending conditions in the economy).
7.1.1 A collateral shock
A positive shock on the collateral (i.e., ηNt > 0) increases activity, inflation investment and
the number of firms as reported in Figure 9. In this situation, the rise in the entrepreneurs’
net wealth has two complementary effects on total investment: a direct effect on the total
amount of personal resources and an implied effect on the access of entrepreneurs to bank
loans, as it allows them to get more loans at a lower interest rate (as observed, the loan
on credit RLt decreases following the shock). The rise in financial resources is dispatched
between investment and new firms. The entry of new firms is favoured by the increase in
their share value coming from the increase in the selling price of goods. Thus, the rise in
activity combines the joint rise of the extensive and intensive margins.
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Figure 9: System response to an estimated collateral shock ηNt measured in percentage
deviations from steady state. Mean IRF is reported in blue and 5th and 95th percentiles
are reported in grey area.
Note: The blue line is the mean of the distribution of the IRFs generated when
parameters are drawn from the posterior distribution as reported in Figure 4.
7.1.2 A credit rate mark-up shock
A positive mark-up shock on loan interest rates (i.e., ηLt > 0) depresses the economy, as
shown in Figure 10. This shock corresponds to an exogenous deterioration of the borrowing
conditions offered to entrepreneurs. Namely, by increasing the cost of loans to entrepreneurs
it depresses both investment in existing firms and in the creation of new varieties. As it
reduces firms’ profits, this shock diminishes consumption, which combined with the drop
in investment reduces the final demand for goods. This induces deflation in the economy
which translates into a reduction in the value of firms after 3 quarters. This decrease in
firms’ value negatively affects the no-arbitrage condition for entry, which decreases the
number of new production lines in the economy. Thus the drop in activity combines a
decrease in both the intensive and extensive margins.
In contrast with real macroeconomic shocks (where investment in existing production
lines and in new firms move in the opposite way, following the arbitrage of entrepreneur
regarding the allocation of financial resources between these two competing outcomes)
financial shocks appear to be rather destabilizing, as they have a cumulative effect on the
two margins of activity.
7.2 The Contribution of Financial Shocks on the Fluctuations of
the Extensive Margin of Activity
Figure 11 depicts the forecast error variance decomposition for the effective share of entry
(namely the ratio between the number of new products to the existing number of products
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Figure 10: System response to an estimated credit rate shock ηLt measured in percentage
deviations from steady state. Mean IRF is reported in blue and 5th and 95th percentiles
are reported in grey area.
Note: The blue line is the mean of the distribution of the IRFs generated when
parameters are drawn from the posterior distribution as reported in Figure 4.
on the goods market). We decompose the variance of this ratio between five main com-
ponents related to financial shocks (Investment, entrepreneurs’ net worth and the mark
up of lending rate), supply shocks (technology, price and wage mark-up shocks), entry
shocks, monetary policy and demand shock (namely spending and premium shocks). We
contrast 5 time horizons, raking from one quarter (Q1) to ten years (Q40) and report the
unconditional forecast error variance decomposition (Q∞).
As observed, the long run effective share of entry variability (at least from Q10 onwards)
is mainly explained by a combination of two supply shocks (namely the entry, the technology
and the price and wage mark-up shocks) that represent around 70% of total fluctuation
in the ratio. In contrast, the role of financial shocks is rather limited (around 10%). In
the short run, the sources of output fluctuations are more mixed and their relative weight
depends on the selected quarter. The very short run (Q1) offers a very original perspective
on the driving forces of entry. New firm creation is almost entirely explained by two main
factors: financial shocks play a critical role (explaining around 50% of the variance) and
demand shocks.31 In the intermediate time horizons (Q2 to Q4), the entry shock critically
affects the variance of the effective share of entry. Demand shocks explain around 25% of
the variance in Q2 (its highest contribution over the time horizons presented in the figure)
while the contribution of supply shocks is negligible in Q2. One interesting aspect is that
financial shocks have a very marginal effect in Q2, showing that financial conditions are
mainly important for the entry period, while becoming less interesting for the rest of the
analysis.
31This result is explained by the timing of entry as defined in the original framework of Bilbiie et al.
(2007) where new entrants require one period to settle their new business.
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Figure 11: Forecast error variance decomposition at posterior mean for different time hori-
zons (one, two, four, ten, forty and unconditional).
We document in Figure 12 the time path of the effective share of entry on a quarter-on-
quarter basis. The solid line depicts the time path of the ratio in deviation from the steady
state (as reported by the data), while bars depict the size of shocks in the corresponding
point deviation. As observed, the explanatory power of the model is quite high (as the
darker component in the figure that accounts for other factors not taken into account by
the model has only a marginal contribution) and we can link the time path of the ratio to
shocks in a rather reliable way.
In Figure 12, we can distinguish between two time periods. First, up to the financial
crisis of 2007-2009, the fluctuations in the effective share of entry is rather limited (lying
between -5 to +5 %). Most of the time the ratio remains positive (we observe only 4 quarters
with a negative value over 15 years). Over this time period the relative contribution of
demand, supply and financial shocks can be either positive or negative. In contrast, in
the second time period, the financial crisis has deeply impacted the net share of entry, as
the ratio clearly declines up to -20% in 2009 before recovering by the end of the sample
period (although it clearly remains negative). The deep negative effect on entry is driven
by supply shocks, monetary policy and entry shocks between 2007 and 2009. In contrast,
the relative recovery of this ratio after 2009 is driven by monetary policy shocks and (after
2011) by supply shocks. Since the beginning of the financial crisis demand shocks have
had a negative contribution on the evolution of the ratio. As observed, the contribution of
financial shocks is slightly positive up to 2008, while it has a clear depressing impact on
firm entry since 2009.
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Figure 12: Historical decomposition of the net share of entry.
8 The importance of the financial dividend policy and
of the wage bill in advance
The model encompasses two financial shocks that are necessary to fit two financial time
series in the empirical exercise. However the system response to these two shocks was
initially at odds with the data. To fix these issues, we have introduced two new financial
frictions which are deemed necessary to replicate the data: a financial dividend redistri-
bution parameter and a wage bill in advance constraint related to the lending conditions
of the banking system. This section discusses the key role of these financial frictions with
respect to the diffusion of an interest rate shock and a collateral shock.
8.1 The wage bill in advance
As reported in Figure 13, the introduction of a standard wage bill in advance constraint
(as new firms have to finance a fraction γ of their wage bill through loans in Equation 1)
offers an interesting solution to fix the problem observed in the original setting of Bilbiie
et al. (2007) regarding the counter intuitive consequences of a increase of the interest rate
on the number of firms entry. In their setting the creation of new firms is directly linked
to the policy rate. They get a counter intuitive result as an increase in the interest rate
has a contractionary effect on the number of firms. Their result is explained as follows:
An interest rate increase generates deflation and a negative response of GDP and wages.
The increase in the number of entrants occurs because no-arbitrage requires the expected
return on equity to increase along with the ex ante real return on bonds. The increase in
the expected return on equity is brought about by a decrease in the price of shares today
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relative to the future: The procyclical impact response of the real wage translates into a
decrease in today’s equity price via the free entry condition. The cost of firm creation —
which requires labour — decreases, and its expected return increases, inducing an increase
of the investment in new production lines. This expansionary effect of the increase in the
policy rate relies crucially on the link between firm value and the marginal cost implied by
free entry.
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Figure 13: System response to an estimated credit rate mark-up shock ηLt for various
values of γ the share of the wage bill financed by loans to produce new firms.
Note: These IRFs are obtained classically by calibrating the model at the posterior
mean as reported in Table 1 and Table 2.
In our financial environment the creation of new firms by entrepreneurs depends on an
interest rate set by the banking system and no longer on the sole policy rate set by the
monetary authorities. Thus what is important is the link between the lending rate and the
creation of new firms. To get an intuitive result showing that an increase in this interest
rate leads to a decrease in the number of firms we require a positive value for the wage
bill parameter. As underlined in Figure 13, we find that if we neglect the wage in advance
parameter, we get a similar counter intuitive result as BGM. Introducing the assumption
of a wage in advance constraint on the creation of new firms, creates a natural financial
channel on the marginal cost of investing in a new variety of goods is an interesting device
for getting a more intuitive effect of the interest rate rise on the number of new firms.
As depicted in the fourth panel of Figure 13 the introduction of the wage bill financed
by loans succeeds in getting an intuitive impact of loan interest rates on the creation of new
firms. As presented, we get a clear negative impact of an increase in the interest rate faced
by entrepreneurs that can be explained as follows: entrepreneurs have to pay a higher cost
to finance the new production lines. As a consequence, this translates into fewer entries,
even for a very small value of the parameter. Indeed, as the cost of firm creation increases,
this depresses both the value of firms in the economy and the rate of entry. In contrast,
this makes the contribution of the intensive margin to output fluctuations lighter. Finally,
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combining the evolution of the two margins, we find that the depressed impact on the
extensive is higher than the dampening of the intensive margin decrease, which translates
in a much higher impact of monetary policy decisions on activity. Thus, accounting for
financial frictions related to the role of credit decision in the creation of new firms has a
higher impact on both inflation and activity.
8.2 The financial dividend policy
The second major novelty of our set-up is the possibility for entrepreneurs to distribute a
fraction θ of the dividends to households. As previously noted, this assumption affects the
Euler bond equation: the current share price becomes a function of the expected financial
dividends which in turn affects the entry condition. A higher value of this parameter makes
the decision of households to create new firms more sensitive to the financial soundness of
the economy. Figure 14 displays the model response after a collateral shock for various values
of θ. Without redistribution, a positive collateral shock boosts investment and output while
the lending rate and inflation lower. This price drop depresses expected dividends from
firms which in turn diminishes both the share price and the number of entrants. The
introduction of a dividend redistribution policy reverses the negative effect on share price.
The rise in expected dividends from entrepreneurs increases both the share price and the
number of new firms. Indeed, as households take benefits form a higher redistribution of
dividends, they tend to increase the value of shares, which in turn leads to an increase in
firms’ entry.
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Figure 14: System response to an estimated collateral shock ηNt for various values of θ the
share of entrepreneurial dividends redistributed to households.
Note: These IRFs are obtained classically by calibrating the model at the posterior
mean as reported in Table 1 and Table 2.
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9 Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to evaluate the contribution of financial frictions and financial
shocks to US output fluctuations using a DSGE model estimated over the sample time
period 1993Q1 to 2012Q3, once accounting for the extensive margin and intensive margin
of activity. To this aim, we have built a model combining two recent strands of the DSGE
literature: models of the extensive margin of activity following the approach initiated by
Bilbiie et al. (2007) and models taking into account the financial accelerator. In this setting
even if the stock market value of firms still plays a key role in determining the creation of new
goods, we have taken into account the fact that creating new production line requires loans
from financial intermediaries. We have estimated this setting using recent development of
Bayesian econometrics.
We get three main results. First, regarding the analytical contribution to the literature,
we find that financial frictions may play a critical role to replicate real word data. In
particular, in our setting, we have introduced a wage bill in advance constraint that relates
the creation of firms to the lending conditions of the banking system.
Second, in this setting, although the optimal quantity of firm entry is determined by
the household optimizing program, the financial resources of entrepreneurs determine in
fine the effective rate of new firms creation. The financial constraint - related to the need
for entrepreneurs to get loans from the banking system in order to finance investment in
existing firms and the creation of new goods’ varieties - clearly affects the dynamics of the
macroeconomic variables. Thus, in contrast with real macroeconomic shocks (where invest-
ment in existing production lines and in new firms move in the opposite way, following the
arbitrage of entrepreneur regarding the allocation of financial resources between these two
competing outcomes) financial shocks are rather destabilizing, as they have a cumulative
effect on the two margins of activity.
Third, the forecast error variance decomposition of the effective share of entry underline
the critical role of financial factors mainly in the period following the creation of new firms.
In the long run, the effective share of entry variability is mainly explained by supply shocks.
Our analysis has focused on the effect of financial factors on entry. The next step should
be to make the rate of firm exit endogenous and related to the financial situation of the
firms to provide a broader picture of the effect of financial frictions and financial shocks on
the life and death of US enterprises, in particular following the recent financial crisis.
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Appendices
A Data Description and Measurement Equations
We use a similar sample as Smets and Wouters augmented with two financial time series
and one on entry.
• Yt: Real Gross Domestic Product, 3 Decimal, Billions of Chained 2009 Dollars, Quar-
terly, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate. Sources: Fred database.
• Ct: Personal Consumption Expenditures, Billions of Dollars, Quarterly, Seasonally
Adjusted Annual Rate. Sources: Fred database.
• It: Fixed Private Investment, Billions of Dollars, Quarterly, Seasonally Adjusted
Annual Rate. Sources: Fred database.
• Pt: Gross Domestic Product: Implicit Price Deflator, Index 2009=100, Quarterly,
Seasonally Adjusted. Sources: Fred database.
• Rt: Effective Federal Funds Rate, Percent, Quarterly, Not Seasonally Adjusted.
Sources: Fred database.
• Wrt : Nonfarm Business Sector: Real Compensation Per Hour, Index 2009=100, Quar-
terly, Seasonally Adjusted. Sources: Fred database.
• Ht: Nonfarm Business Sector: Average Weekly Hours. Sources: Fred database.
• St: Moody’s Seasoned Baa Corporate Bond Minus Federal Funds Rate, Seasonally
Adjusted Annual Rate. Sources: Fred database.
• Lt: Commercial and Industrial Loans, All Commercial Banks, Billions of U.S. Dollars,
Quarterly, Seasonally Adjusted.Sources: Fred database.
• NEt : Private Sector Establishment Births, Seasonally Adjusted, In thousands. Sources:
Bureau of labour Statistics.
Additional series:
• PLt: Population Level, Civilian non-institutional population, Number in thousands,
16 years and over. Sources: Fred database.
• CE t: Civilian Employment, Thousands of Persons, Quarterly, Seasonally Adjusted.
Sources : Fred database.
• Xt: Private sector establishment deaths (firm exit), seasonally adjusted (In thou-
sands) Sources: Bureau of labour Statistics.
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We first construct a population and employment indexes in line with year of reference of
output, prices and wages (here 2009) such that PL09t = PLt/PL2009 and CE09t = CE t/CE2009.
Following Chang et al. (2002), who point to the limited coverage of the nonfarm business
sector compared to GDP, we multiply the index of average hours for the nonfarm business
sector (all persons) by civilian employment. Letting Xrt , X
l
t and X̂t denote the real, the per
capita and the in logs value of Xt respectively, the per capita transformed series taken in
logs becomes: Ĥlt = 100 log(HtCE09t /PL09t ). We also set in real terms/per capita/logs the
output Ŷrlt = 100 log
(Yt/PL09t /Pt), consumption Ĉrlt = 100 log (Ct/PL09t /Pt), investment
Îrlt = 100 log
(It/PL09t /Pt) and loans L̂rlt = 100 log (Lt/PL09t /Pt). Finally for entry, we
assume as in the model an exit rate of 2.5%, then we generate Nt the total number of firms
using entry and exit series from the bureau of labour statistics. The log share of entry is
then N̂Et = 100 log(NEt /Nt). Finally, we also set in logs prices Pˆt = 100 log(Pt) and real
wages Ŵrt = 100 log(Wrt ).
Letting ∆Xt denote the temporal difference of Xt, the vector of observable can be
summarized:
yobst =
[
∆Ŷrlt ∆Ĉrlt ∆Îrlt Ĥlt ∆Pˆt ∆Ŵrt Rt/4 St/4 ∆L̂rlt N̂Et
]′
,
where seriesRt and St are set on a quarterly basis by dividing them by 4. The measurement
equations are defined by:
ymt =
[
log
(
Y dt
Y dt−1
)
log
(
Ct
Ct−1
)
log
(
It
It−1
)
log (Ht) log
(
piCt
)
log
(
wt
wt−1
)
Rt
1+RLt
1+Rt
log
(
Lt+1
Lt
)
log
(
nt
nt−1(1−δ) − 1
) ]′
Here, we rearranged the law of motion of firms in Equation 20 to get the effective number
of firms entering the market.
Since we don’t use the information contained in the mean of the observable matrix, we
put the model to the data assuming:
yobst − E
[
yobst
]
= ymt − E [ymt ] (61)
where E
[
yobst
]
is the empirical mean and E [ymt ] is the theoretical one (i.e. the steady state
of measurements equations).
B Model Summary
B.1 Non-linear model
B.1.1 Households
The marginal utility of consumption can be expressed as:
λct = (Ct − hCt−1)−σC (62)
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The Euler deposit condition on deposits is:
βEt
{
λct+1
λct
}
eε
B
t (1 + rt) = 1. (63)
The Euler equation on share is:
vt = (1− δ) βEt
{
λct+1
λct
(
dt+1 + vt+1 + θd
E
t+1
)}
. (64)
The labour supply equation is:
λctw
h
t = χH
σH
jt (65)
The free entry equation is determined by:
fEmc
E
t = vt
∂
(
1− ACEt
)
nEt
∂nEt
eε
E
t + βEt
{
vt+1
∂
(
1− ACEt+1
)
∂nEt
nEt+1e
εEt+1
}
. (66)
B.1.2 Unions
The optimal wage setting is determined by:
Wt
PCt
= µWt
W ht
PCt
− (µWt − 1)Wt [ACW ′t + βEt{λct+1λct Ht+1Ht ACW ′t+1
}]
(67)
B.1.3 Installed Firms
The production function is defined by:
ntYt = e
εAt
(
Kut+1
)α (
Hdt
)1−α
, (68)
The utilized capital involved in the production is reads:
Kui+1 = utKt (69)
the real marginal cost expression:
mct =
1
eε
A
t
(zt
α
)α( wt
(1− α)
)(1−α)
. (70)
From the cost minimization problem, inputs also satisfy:
αHdt wt = (1− α)Kut+1zt. (71)
The relative price is set as a mark-up over the marginal cost of production:
ρt = µtmct (72)
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where the endogenous mark-up µit is computed in the following way:
µt = e
εPt
P
(P − 1)
(
1− PCt
Pt
ACPt
)
+ κPΨt
, (73)
and:
Ψt = (pit − [ξPpit−1 + (1− ξP )]) pit − βEt
{
λct+1
λct
(
(pit − [ξPpit−1 + (1− ξP )]) pit+1Yt+1
Yt
)}
The profit of firms i is determined by:
dt =
(
ρt −mct − ACPt
)
Yt (74)
B.1.4 Startups
The production technology of new goods is:
nEt fE = e
εAt HEt (75)
the marginal cost of producing a new firm is:
mcEt =
wt
eε
A
t
(
1 + γrLt
)
(76)
B.1.5 Entrepreneurs
The balance sheet of entrepreneurs is:
Lt+1 +NWt+1 = QtKt+1 + γWtH
E
t (77)
The cutoff point is:
ωCt
(
1 + rkt
)
Qt−1Kt =
(
1 + rLt−1
)
Lt. (78)
The external finance premium can be expressed as:
1 + Etrkt+1
1 + rLt
=
κ− 1
κω¯C
[
κ
κ− 1
(
Lt+1
QtKt+1
)]κ
(79)
The law of motion of entrepreneurs’ net wealth is:
NWt+1 = (1− δ) (1− θ) dEt + TE
The entrepreneurial dividends are:
ntd
E
t = ηt
(
ω¯t − ωCt
) (
1 +Rkt
)
Qt−1Kteε
N
t (80)
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B.1.6 Financial Intermediaries
The marginal cost of one unit of loans is:
1 +MCLt = (1 +Rt)Et
[
ηt+1 +
(
1− µB) (1− ηt+1) ωt+1
ωCt+1
]−1
(81)
The nominal lending rate is:
RLt = µ
L
tMC
L
t −
(
µLt − 1
)
RLt
(
∂ACLt
∂RLt
+ βEt
{
λct+1
λct
∂ACLt+1
∂RLt
Lt+2
Lt+1
})
(82)
And we set in real terms the lending rate:
1 + rLt =
1 +RLt
EtpiCt+1
(83)
B.1.7 Capital Suppliers
The law of motion of capital reads as follows:
Kt+1 = e
εIt
(
1− ACIt
)
It + (1− δ)Kt (84)
The shadow value of one unit of capital is given by:
εIt qt = 1 + e
εIt qt
∂
(
IktAC
I
kt
)
∂Ikt
+ βEt
{
λct+1
λct
eε
I
t+1piCt+1qt+1
∂
(
Ikt+1AC
I
kt+1
)
∂Ikt
}
. (85)
The optimal utilization rate of capital is determined by:32
zt = Z¯e
ψ/(1−ψ)(ut−1) (86)
The profitability of one unit of capital is:
1 + rkt =
ztut − Φ (ut) + (1− δ) qt
qt−1
(87)
B.1.8 Equilibrium conditions
The Taylor rule is:
Rt− R¯ = ρ
(
Rt−1 − R¯
)
+(1− ρR)
[
φpi (pit − 1) + φY
(
Yt − Y¯
)]
+φ∆Y (Yt − Yt−1)+εRt (88)
And the real interest rate is:
1 + rt =
1 +Rt
EtpiCt+1
(89)
32The problem faced by capital suppliers when choosing the optimal utilization rate is :
minut P
C
t Φ (ut)Kt − ZtutKt.
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The total demand in the economy follows:
Y dt = Ct + It + G¯ε
G
t + Φ (ut)Kt−1 + ntAC
P
t Yt + AC
W
t Ht + AC
L
t Lt+1 (90)
The relative price ρt = Pt/P
C
t is:
ntρ
1−P
t = 1 (91)
The inflation rate of consumption goods piCt accordingly:
ρt
ρt−1
=
pit
piCt
(92)
The market equilibrium on the good market is determined by:
ntYt = ρ
−P
t Y
d
t (93)
And the labour market is:
Ht = H
d
t +H
E
t (94)
Finally, the law of motion of firms is:
njt = (1− δ)
(
njt−1 + eε
E
t−1
(
1− ACEjt−1
)
nEjt−1
)
(95)
B.2 Steady state
B.2.1 The Financial Contract
First, we can solve the financial contract in steady state. First with β = .0.992 and
zero inflation in steady state p¯iC = p¯i = 1, the real interest rate using the Euler bond
Equation 63 is: r¯ = R¯ = β−1 − 1. We deduct the lending rate using our calibration,
R¯L = r¯L = (1 + 0.98/100)R¯− 1.
Concerning the Pareto distribution ω ∼ P (κ;ωmin), parameter κ is the shape parameter
and ωmin the minimum value of ω ∈ [ωmin; +∞) and ω is the endogenous risk of investment
project. The minimum value of ω corresponds to a frictionless economy, such that there is
no risk in the economy (i.e. the default rate is 0 and there is no spread r¯L = r¯k). First,
assuming a 50% entrepreneurial leverage ratio L¯/K¯ = 0.50 and using the endogenous
threshold Equation 78, the value of the minimum bound is:
ωmin = L¯/K¯ = 0.50. (96)
Second, the first order condition of entrepreneurs in steady state implies,
(
1 + r¯k
)
/
(
1 + r¯L
)
=
(κ− 1) / (κω¯C), and in a riskless situation it becomes, 1 = (κ− 1) / (κωmin), then we obtain
the shape of the Pareto distribution:
κ = 1/ (1− ωmin) = K¯/L¯ = 2. (97)
Following Bernanke et al. (1999), the steady state entrepreneurs’ default rate is set at 2.5%
on an annual basis, 1− η¯ = 2.5/400. The Pareto distribution implies that the survival rate
is, η¯ = Pr
[
ω ≥ ω¯C] = (ωmin/ω¯C)κ, from this definition we obtain ω¯C :
ω¯C = ωminη¯
−κ (98)
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and the profitability of one unit of capital is determined by the endogenous cut-off point
Equation 78:
r¯K =
(
1 + r¯L
)
ω¯C
(
1− L¯
K¯
)
− 1 (99)
and the marginal product of capital z¯ defined by Equation 87 is:
z¯ = rk + δ (100)
where q¯ = u¯ = 1 and Φ (u¯) = 0. We are now able to deduct the steady state marginal
cost of credit. To compute it, we use statistical properties of the conditional mean, as mcL
involves the conditional mean of defaulting investment projects ω. First as in Bernanke
et al. (1999), the expected value is normalized, E [ω] = 1. Since we know the value of
profitable investment project, ω¯ = κ
κ−1 ω¯
C , we can obtain its negative counterpart as the
conditional mean verifies:
E [ω] = 1 = η¯ω¯ + (1− η¯)ω (101)
Then we obtain:
ω =
(1− η¯ω¯)
(1− η¯) (102)
Then we obtain,
mcL = (1 + r¯)
[
η¯ +
(
1− µB) (1− η¯) ω
ω¯C
]−1
− 1 (103)
Then the mark-up on loans is:
µL =
r¯L − 1
mcL − 1 (104)
B.2.2 The Number of Firms
Obtaining the steady state number of firms is critical for models with entry and the presence
of financial frictions complicates its computation. We first start with Equation 64, the Euler
shares equation:
1− (1− δ) β
(1− δ) β v¯ = d¯+ θd¯
E (105)
where d¯, d¯E and v¯ are going to be replaced in the next step. First concerning Equation 74 of
d¯, we replace mc = ρ¯/µ¯ using Equation 72, dividends now are given by, d¯ = Y¯ ρ¯ (µ¯− 1) /µ¯.
Second turning to d¯E, we have d¯E = η¯ω¯
C
κ−1
(
1 + r¯k
)
K¯
n¯
from Equation 80 with q¯ = 1. Third,
the free entry condition defined by Equation 66 can be expressed as, v¯ = fEmc
E which can
be rewritten replacing mcE from Equation 76, now we obtain, v¯ = fEw¯
(
1 + γr¯L
)
. We can
rearrange Equation 105 to get:
1− (1− δ) β
(1− δ) β fEw¯
(
1 + γr¯L
)
= Y¯ ρ¯
(µ¯− 1)
µ¯
+ dK
K¯
n¯
, (106)
where dK = θη¯ω¯C (κ− 1)−1 (1 + r¯k). Using the first order conditions of installed firms,
the marginal product of capital is, z¯ = αn¯Y¯ mc/K¯, and labour, w¯ = (1− α) n¯Y¯ mc/H¯d.
46
With mc = ρ¯/µ¯, the steady state value of K¯ is, K¯ = αn¯Y¯ ρ¯/(z¯µ¯), and the real wage is
w¯ = (1− α) n¯Y¯ ρ¯/(H¯dµ¯). Replacing w¯ and K¯ in Equation 106 leads to:
1− (1− δ) β
(1− δ) β fE (1− α)
n¯
H¯d
(
1 + γr¯L
)
= (µ¯− 1) + dK α
z¯
. (107)
Finally to get n¯ from Equation 106, we needs to rewrite H¯d. The labour market equilibrium
defined by Equation 94 is, H¯ = H¯d + H¯E, where H¯ = 1/3. The production function of
startup as detailed in Equation 75, is in steady state, n¯EfE = H¯
E. Using in steady state
the law of motion of firms of Equation 95, n¯E = n¯δ/ (1− δ), the demand from startups
production is, H¯E = fEn¯δ/ (1− δ). Thus we can replace H¯d:
1− (1− δ) β
(1− δ) β fE (1− α)
n¯
H¯ − fE δ(1−δ) n¯
(
1 + γr¯L
)
= (µ¯− 1) + dK α
z¯
. (108)
Gathering n¯, the steady state amount of firms is:
n¯ = H¯
[
(1− (1− δ) β) fE (1− α)
(
1 + γr¯L
)
(1− δ) β ((µ¯− 1) + dK α
z¯
) + fE δ
(1− δ)
]−1
(109)
where dK = θη¯ω¯C (κ− 1)−1 (1 + r¯k).
Assuming no financial frictions (such that, γ = θ = 0) and normalizing to one the entry
cost fE = 1, the number of firms is close to Bilbiie et al. (2007).
33
Our model delivers a number of firms of n¯ = 1.0726, which is lower than the value
obtained by Bilbiie et al. (2007). As reported in Figure 15, this result is mainly explained
by higher entry costs. The left hand side panel depicts the interaction between the sunk
cost fE, the number of firms n¯ and the investment-to-gdp ratio I¯/Y¯
d. In our setting high
sunk costs are deemed necessary to get an investment-to-gdp ratio consistent with the data
(at the expense of the number of firms).
The middle and right hand side panels of Figure 15 depict the effects of financial frictions
on the steady state number of firms: As observed, the entrepreneurial dividend policy
encourages firms to enter the market while the wage bill in advance constraint has the
opposite effect.
B.2.3 The rest of the steady state
It is now straightforward to get the steady state of the model. First, the relative price from
Equation 91 and marginal cost of goods are:
ρ¯ = n¯
1
P−1 and mc = ρ¯/µ¯ (110)
And the number of entrants:
n¯E = n¯
δ
(1− δ) (111)
33The gap between Bilbiie et al. (2007) and our set-up is explained by the utility function, we introduce
a shift parameter χ for labour in the utility function as Christiano et al. (2014) which allows us to calibrate
the steady state amount of hours worked H¯.
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Figure 15: The steady state number of firms, according to the calibration of the sunk cost
fE, the dividend policy θ and the wage bill in advance constraint γ.
The labour demand from both entrants and installed:
H¯E = fEn¯
δ
(1− δ) and H¯
d = H¯ − H¯E (112)
We obtain the real wage using the steady state marginal cost from Equation 70:
w¯ = (1− α)
[
mc
(α
z¯
)α]1/(1−α)
(113)
Since capital utilization is normalized in steady state u¯ = 1, then K¯u = K¯, the amount of
capital in the economy is using Equation 71:
K¯ =
α
z¯ (1− α)H¯
dw¯ (114)
The rest of the steady state is now straightforward to obtain. Our estimated DSGE model
delivers the following steady state for the main variables of interest: r¯ = 0.0081, r¯L =
0.0179, µL = 2.1248, n¯ = 1.0726, ρ¯ = 1.0254, K¯ = 5.6037, r¯
k = 0.0154, ω¯C = 0.5013,
Y¯ = 0.6983, Y¯ d = 0.8238 and C¯ = 0.5354.
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